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Abstract 
This paper was originally written for Dr. Sarah Walshaw’s History 344 course 
Themes in Modern East Africa. The assignment asked students to write a literature 
review on the historiography of an important event in East African history. The 
literature review was not intended to be exhaustive of all scholarly works written 
about a selected topic but rather to explore the historiography in a limited way by 
framing a specific question or theme. The paper uses Chicago citation style.  
 
 
In 2006, the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction was awarded to Caroline 
Elkins’ Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya, which 
detailed the Mau Mau rebellion of early 1950s Kenya and, in so doing, pointed a 
damning finger at the moral legacy of British imperialism. Despite this prestigious 
award, the book received more mixed reviews among historians. Some praised 
Elkins’ original research on the detention camps while others criticized her as 
“being blinded by prosecutorial zeal” to the extent that she was a mere political 
activist masquerading as a historian.1 While many historians today are certainly no 
enthusiastic supporters of British imperialism, that they felt ambivalent towards 
Elkins’ work is not entirely surprising considering the rich historiography of the 
Mau Mau rebellion that offers many lenses through which to assess British moral 
legacy. This essay, then, will review the academic literature to show how scholars 
have varied in assessing British responsibility for the horrors of the Mau Mau 
                                                 
1  Pascal James Imperato, "Differing Perspectives on Mau Mau," African Studies Review 48, no. 3 
(2005), 150. 
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rebellion. To do so, this review will narrow its focus on the logic of jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello.  
Jus ad bellum, literally meaning “right to war,” refers to the causes under 
which armed force can be justifiably used. One aspect to jus ad bellum hinges 
upon force being the only effective option. In the context of the Mau Mau 
rebellion, the colonial government of Kenya and British press painted the Mau 
Mau as atavistic, uniquely savage, and even deranged.2 This framing of the Mau 
Mau as psychotic killers stressing their irrationality implicitly argued that any 
non-violent response would be ineffective. Following Kenyan independence, this 
colonial framing came under attack in 1966 by John Nottingham and Carl 
Rosberg through their seminal work, The Myth of “Mau Mau”, which asserted that 
the Mau Mau were not deranged thugs motivated by atavistic tribalism, but rather 
modern nationalists.3 In the authors’ view, these Kikuyu nationalists were left 
with little choice but to adopt a militant approach since the colonial government 
had steadfastly refused, in the decades prior to the rebellion, to enact urgently 
needed political reform to give Kikuyu a meaningful voice in politics. According 
to this logic, Mau Mau rebels were perfectly rational agents who could have been 
negotiated with nonviolent political reform, thus invalidating the invalidity of 
nonviolent response as claimed by the colonial government. As influential as this 
nationalist interpretation has been, later generations of scholars have come to 
dispute it based on the rebels’ failure to build loyalty among non-Kikuyu 
minorities or the localized nature of the conflict which did not extend beyond the 
Central Province of Kenya.4 Nevertheless, this radical rethinking of the Mau Mau 
inspired other historians to follow with their own revisionist interpretations. For 
instance, David Throup highlighted how the colonial government had favoured 
white settler agriculture over African agriculture. Hence, in his opinion, the real 
roots of the rebellion were the ill-conceived economic policies that created a large 
                                                 
2 John Lonsdale, "Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya," The Journal of 
African History 31, no. 3 (1990), 397-398.  
3 John Nottingham Carl G. Rosberg, The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya (New York: 
Praeger, 1970), xvi-xvii. 
4 Wunyabari O. Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 170. 
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class of disaffected, landless, homeless, and impoverished Kikuyu men. 5 In 
contrast, Luise White pointed out how colonial imposition of ideal marriage roles 
and gender relations had created resentment among young Kikuyu men who 
lacked either social or financial capital to attain this ideal.6 While these revisionist 
scholars varied in attributing the rebellion’s cause, their common point was that 
the colonial government had failed to pay sufficient attention to Kikuyu 
grievances, whether these grievances arose from nationalist, ethnic, socioeconomic, 
anti-colonial, or gender-based concerns. Hence, they agreed for the most part that 
the colonial government should have sought to address these grievances rather 
than assuming brute force was the only effective option. 
The second aspect to the logic of jus ad bellum is the perpetrator’s motive. If, 
as discussed above, the colonial government was indeed mistaken in their belief 
that force was the only effective solution, then one could at least defend the 
morality of its actions on the basis of good intentions. On this point, the academic 
view is divided between those who see British response as complying with eventual 
plans for decolonisation and those who see it as resisting plans for decolonisation. 
This latter view sides with an anti-colonial framework that casts the colonial 
government as complicit with the self-interests of the racist, white settler 
community, which was the opinion of Arghiri Emmanuel.7 Dane Kennedy, on 
the other hand, rejects this view for the overly simplistic depiction of white settlers 
as uniformly racist.8 He instead points to the substantial strain of liberal 
paternalism among white settlers and colonial officials.9 This motive to modernize 
Africans and lay the foundations for eventual decolonisation is why they felt so 
threatened by the Mau Mau, whom they believed to represent barbaric atavism 
borne from the difficulties of transitioning from tribalism to modernism. As such, 
                                                 
5 David W. Throup, "The Origins of Mau Mau," The Royal African Society 84, no. 336 (1985). 
6 Luise White, "Separating the Men from the Boys: Constructions of Gender, Sexuality, and 
Terrorism in Central Kenya, 1939-1959," The International Journal of African Historical Studies 23, no. 1 
(1990). 
7 Arghiri Emmanuel, "White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism," in 
Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies", ed. Teodor Shanin Hamza Alavi (London: 
Macmillan Education, 1982). 
8 Dane Kennedy, "Constructing the Colonial Myth of Mau Mau," The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies 25, no. 2 (1992), 243. 
9 Ibid.  
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British response was motivated by a paradoxical union between liberals who 
approved decolonisation and conservatives who disapproved it.10 However, David 
Percox, who investigated whether the liberals’ intentions went any further than 
mere rhetoric, concluded thus: 
 
Moreover, only when the military campaign was over were the ‘major’ 
political reforms which arguably anticipated decolonisation implemented. At 
no stage did the British COIN [counter-insurgency] campaign in Kenya 
constitute part of a Colonial Office plan for decolonisation. . . . 
Decolonisation in Kenya was not conducted through counter-insurgency, but 
after.11 
 
This debate on whether or not the colonial government had morally justifiable 
motives was more recently injected with fresh air by Caroline Elkins who, using 
previously classified documents and oral testimonies, reassessed British intentions 
of rehabilitation. Through this research, she revealed the scandalous nature of the 
so-called rehabilitation system which was not only extremely understaffed due to 
its shoestring budget, but also frequently equated rehabilitation with physical and 
emotional abuse.12 This was how she came to the dramatic conclusion that they 
were more comparable to gulags than genuine rehabilitation camps. While her 
critics have argued that Elkins exaggerated the estimates of possible Kikuyu 
casualties and relied too heavily on alleged testimony, a later study by A.R. 
Baggallay which examined another declassified War Office file corroborated the 
phony nature of well-meaning rehabilitation.13 One War Office report even 
admitted that “rehabilitation is a name only.”14 Hence, as it currently stands, it 
appears difficult to state that British response was guided wholly on morally 
justifiable motivations.  
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 David A. Percox, "British Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56: Extension of Internal Security 
Policy or Prelude to Decolonisation?," Small Wars & Insurgencies 9, no. 3 (1998), 90-91. 
12 Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry 
Holt, 2005). 
13 A. R. Baggallay, "Myths of Mau Mau Expanded: Rehabilitation in Kenya's Detention Camps, 
1954-60," Journal of Eastern African Studies 5, no. 3 (2011), 571-572. 
14 Ibid. 
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The third and final aspect to jus ad bellum concerns the validity of a threat. As 
already noted, the Mau Mau were initially characterized as uniquely savage. The 
Mau Mau’s oathing ritual which involved the mutilation of a goat highly offended 
Christian sensibilities, as did the manner of killing which left victims’ corpses 
hacked to pieces. The fact that Mau Mau occasionally killed even women and 
children, as infamously exemplified in the Lari Massacre, further intensified the 
fears of the white settler community.15 Nevertheless, John Lonsdale has offered an 
alternative way to contextualize these sensationalized killings. In his view, since 
the official data listed 12,590 Mau Mau killed in action and 1,880 civilians killed 
by Mau Mau, of which only 58 were non-Blacks, Mau Mau killing appears 
restrained, especially if the majority of Kikuyu had taken at least one Mau Mau 
oath as some believed.16 However, this comparison of casualties does not account 
for the sheer scale of military force brought down upon the Mau Mau as outlined 
by John Newsinger.17 That the Mau Mau failed to inflict as much violence as they 
took could be more reasonably attributed to this overwhelming military 
mobilization and ample support given to loyalists by the colonial government. 
Regardless of the government’s responsibility for making armed rebellion 
inevitable or the dismissal of the possible effectiveness of non-violent response, the 
Mau Mau clearly did engage in brutal slaughter and posed a threat to Kenya’s 
internal stability. Nonetheless, this disproportionate use of force leads to one last 
separate issue to consider when assessing British moral legacy: jus in bello. 
Jus in bello, literally meaning “right in war,” refers to the conduct under 
which armed force can be justifiably carried out. Applied to the Mau Mau 
rebellion, one must examine whether or not British use of force was excessive and 
violated due process of law. Now even back at the time of the rebellion, there were 
individuals such as D. H. Rawcliffe, a white settler, who claimed that physical 
abuse was rampant for any Kikuyu detainee.18 However, the traditional, pro-
colonial view usually marginalises any unlawful violence on unconvicted suspects 
                                                 
15 Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya, 51-52. 
16 Lonsdale, "Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya," 398. 
17 John Newsinger, "Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the Mau Mau Rebellion," 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 3, no. 1 (1992). 
18 Ibid., 51. 
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by arguing that such cases were isolated incidents, and when they did occur, it was 
usually a non-military member acting outside the official policy.19 This view has 
become increasingly untenable over time. Historian Anthony Clayton, all the way 
back in 1976, examined documented behaviour of security forces to argue that 
unlawful violence had indeed been the norm, not the exception, official policy be 
damned.20 More recently, David Anderson examined many previously declassified 
files to argue not only that suspects were detained without fair trial and then 
regularly tortured, but also that capital sentences were frivolously handed out in 
so-called fair trials which accepted even the flimsiest of testimonial evidence.21 
Elkins’ research on detainment and rehabilitation camps, as already discussed, 
further corroborates this grim view. If Britain did use disproportionately coercive 
and unlawful measures to suppress both actual and suspected Mau Mau rebels, 
then one final point to consider is whether this can really be considered excessive. 
Counter-insurgency warfare is a type of conflict in which the exact number or 
identities of the enemy cannot be nailed down. Given this fog of war, casting as 
wide a net as possible may be rational according to military logic. As military 
historian David French summarises the logic of British counter-insurgency 
strategy: “That the innocent were bound to suffer alongside the guilty was 
inevitable, acceptable, and could be beneficial.”22 However, Percox argues that the 
colonial government’s very choice to meet the Mau Mau threat with 
disproportionate force by detaining any suspected Mau Mau supporters and 
expelling Kikuyu squatters from settlers’ farms en masse did not constitute sound 
military rationale as it merely compelled Kikuyu who were already disaffected with 
colonial rule to join guerrilla forces.23 Similarly, modern-day military analysts and 
army generals such as Johnathan Dowdall and David Petraeus respectively agree 
that this traditional mode of counter-insurgency that punishes civilians is counter-
                                                 
19 Ibid., 50. 
20 Ibid., 52. 
21 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of the Empire (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2005). 
22 David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 65. 
23 Percox, "British Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56: Extension of Internal Security Policy or 
Prelude to Decolonisation?."66 
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productive, as recent U.S. military conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown.24 
In summary, the assessment of British moral legacy in its response to the Mau 
Mau rebellion in the context of jus in bello principles has become viewed in more 
and more negative light over time. 
While historians often note that colonised peoples have had difficulties in 
grappling with colonial legacies since achieving independence, perhaps the same 
could be said of the colonisers, at least in historiography. Discussion on the extent 
to which British rule can be held morally accountable for its forceful suppression 
of the Mau Mau rebellion has certainly proved neither static nor one-sided; some 
saw British actions in more favourable, though not entirely agreeable, light while 
others saw it in a more wholly negative light. This paper has attempted to provide 
a brief review of the academic literature on this topic with respect to the logic of 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Through this review, one can see that while Mau 
Mau did indeed kill many civilians, historians have come to dismiss the initial 
assertions of the colonial government that force was the only effective option and 
that it was judiciously used with the best of intentions, such as eventual 
decolonisation, in mind. By doing so, scholarly consensus on the Mau Mau 
rebellion, if there is such a thing, has gradually, though not smoothly, inched 
towards a more morally negative interpretation. Hence, the fact that Caroline 
Elkins’ Imperial Reckoning drew both enthusiastic praise and sharp criticism can 
perhaps be attributed to her methodology and dramatic rhetoric as much as this 
ever-changing debate on the true nature of the Mau Mau rebellion. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
24 M. L.R. Smith Jonathan Dowdall, "Counter-Insurgency in the Grey: The Ethical Challenge for 
Military Conduct," Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 1 (2010). 
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